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DOMICILE PREFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT:
THE CASE OF ALASKA HIRE
In 1972 the state of Alaska enacted legislation, commonly referred
to as "Alaska Hire," requiring private employers to give Alaskan citi-
zens a first-hired, last-fired preference in jobs arising from state oil and
gas leases.' The stated purposes of the hiring preference2 were to up-
grade Alaska's human resources in conjunction with natural resource
management3 and to reduce unemployment.4 The hiring preference
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
B. CURImE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited as CuR-
RIE];
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
1. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40 (1977). These jobs include work in the extraction and distribution
of oil and gas as *el as related pipeline construction. Section 38A0.050(a) provided:
Applicability of chapter. (a) The provisions of this chapter apply to all employment
which is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or
gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of any of the preced-
ing to which the state is a party after July 7, 1972; however, the activity which generates
the employment must take place inside the state and it must take place either on the
property under the control of the person subject to this chapter or be directly related to
activity taking place on the property under his control and the activity must be per-
formed directly for the person subject to this chapter or his contractor or a subcontractor
of his contractor or a supplier of his contractor or subcontractor.
["Person subject to this chapter" refers to an employer-lessee. "Property under his control" refers
to property acquired by lease or right-of-way permit.]
2. ALASKA STAT. § 38A0.030(a) (1977), which established the hiring preference, provided:
Resident employment. (a) In order to create, protect and preserve the right of
Alaska residents to employment, the commissioner of natural resources shall incorporate
into all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline pur-
poses, unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the
state is a party, provisions requiring the lessee to comply with applicable laws and regu-
lations with regard to the employment of Alaska residents, a provision requiring the
employment of Alaska residents, a provisioh prohibiting discrimination against Alaska
residents, and, when in the determination of the commissioner of natural resources it is
practicable, a provision requiring compliance with the Alaska Plan, all in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.
3. State Policy. It is the policy of the state in the development of its natural resources
to seek and accomplish the development of its human resources by providing maximum
employment opportunities for its residents in conjunction with natural resource manage-
ment.
ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.010 (1977).
4. Legislative findings. The legislature finds that Alaska has a uniquely high unem-
ployment record among the states due both to cultural and geographical migration barri-
ers which record has existed for many years and which experts have attested will persist
without drastic governmental intervention. The legislature further finds that employ-
ment opportunities which from time to time occur in the areas of the state suffering from
the largest chronic unemployment problem are nonrecurring and usually relate to the
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went to those having a physical presence in Alaska' and presenting sev-
eral indicia of intent to remain in the state. The preference thus was
for persons domiciled in the state or bona fide residents.7 In 1977 the
Alaska Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the prefer-
ence's durational residency or "waiting period" component. 8
This Note focuses on the constitutional validity of Alaska's
nondurational domicile employment preference. The analysis covers
the article IV privileges and immunities clause and the interstate com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution and the dimensions of
state leasing power. The Note looks favorably upon Hicklin v.
Orbeck,9 in which a unanimous United States Supreme Court invali-
dated the nondurational aspects of Alaska Hire' 0 on privileges and im-
munities clause grounds.11 Finally, it examines some of the adverse
consequences of using other possible domicile employment preferences.
exploitation of the state's natural resources and that the state has an obligation to assure
that the benefits of this employment enure to the residents of the state.
ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.020 (1977).
5. Before the striking of the durational aspects of the resident hiring preference, see note 9
infra, ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.090(l)(A) (1977) provided:
Definitions. In this chapter (1) "resident" means a person who (A) except for brief
intervals, military service, attendance at an educational or training institution, or for
absences for good cause, is physically present in the state for a period of one year imme-
diately before the time his status is determined ....
6. Both the statutory language and its judicial interpretation focused on intent. Thestatute
provided that "(1) 'resident' means a person who. . .(E) shows by all attending circumstances
that his intent is to make Alaska his permanent residence . . . ." ALASKA STAT. §
38.40.090(l)(E) (1977). With the exception of the one year residency requirement found in §
38.40.090(l)(A), see note 9 infra, the Alaska Supreme Court approved the use of the objective
indicia listed in § 38.40.090(l) to determine whether an applicant had the subjective intent re-
quired by § 38A0.090(l)(E). Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 171 (Alas. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct.
2482 (1978). Hence, among the matters to be considered were whether the applicant was one who
"(B) maintains a place of residence within the State; (C) has established residency for voting
purposes within the State; [and] (D) has not, within the period of required residency, claimed
residency in another state .... " § 38.40.090(l) (B)-(D).
7. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 171.
8. See note 9 infra.
9. 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978). The eight Hicklin plaintiffs had applied for jobs on the Alaska
pipeline. The defendants, the Alaska Commissioners of Labor and Natural Resources, refused to
grant the plaintiffs the necessary permission to obtain such employment on the grounds that the
plaintiffs met neither the one year nor the bona fide residency requirements of Alaska Hire. The
plaintiffs brought suit in state superior court contesting both residency tests. The trial court up-
held the law in its entirety. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 162 (Alas. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct.
2482 (1978). On appeal the Alaska Supreme Court unanimously found the durational require-
ment violative of the fundamental right to interstate travel. 565 P.2d at 162-63 (citing inter alia
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency requirement for welfare benefits
invalidated)). The court then divided three to two in upholding the domicile test. The plaintiffs
appealed only this affirmance of the nondurational residency requirement to the United States
Supreme Court. 98 S. Ct. at 2486 & n.6.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. 98 S. Ct. at 2488, 2492 n.19.
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I. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The privileges and immunitites clause of article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution provides that "[tihe Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the sev-
eral States." 2 The provision is sometimes called the "interstate privi-
leges and immunities clause,"' 3 since it serves to insure "a citizen of
State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citi-
zens of State B enjoy." 14 , It should be distinguished from the equal
protection clause, which prohibits state discrimination against "per-
son[s] within its jurisdiction,"' 5 and the fourteenth amendment privi-
leges and immunities clause, 6 which purports to protect the privileges
of national citizenship from state infringement. 7
The intended political function of the article IV clause was to
"help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign
States."'" The early case history of the provision reflects a debate over
whether promoting this function required each state to guarantee to
noncitizens only those rights which, are "fundamental [and belong] to
the citizens of all free governments" 9 or required them also to guaran-
tee all rights granted to each state's own citizens.20 For a long period
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
13. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COM-
MENTs-QUESTIONS 391 (4th ed. 1975).
14. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). The Hicklin Court noted that "the terms
'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially interchangeable"' in this context. 98 S. Ct. 2487 n.8.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See CuRR 475. The two clauses also differ with re-
spect to their historical purpose, see text accompanying note 74 infra, and their standard of re-
view, see text accompanying notes 75-81 infra.
16. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. The clause, however, has never operated to restrain any state legislation in its one hun-
dred year history. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36 (1872). See also
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 13, at 520. But Sf. Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 178, 182 (1941), in which both Justices Douglas and Jackson in concurring opinions
stated that the right to move freely from state to state is an incident of national citizenship. The
interstate commerce clause, id at 160, and the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process
clauses, W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 13, at 520-21, have assumed the
function of the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause.
Hereinafter, mention of "the privileges and immunities clause" refers to that of article IV.
18. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
19. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). These fundamental rights
are similar to those known as "natural rights." See TRmE 405-07.
20. The literal language of the clause refers to "all privileges and immunities." The Articles
. of Confederation version had a similar provision:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of these States, paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of free citizens in the several States ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
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following the 1868 Supreme Court decision in Paul v. Virginia2l the
latter position prevailed. 22  Recently, however, the Court has at-
tempted to revive the fundamental right versus ordinary right distinc-
tion.23
The Hicklin plaintiffs asserted that Alaska's local hiring plan in-
fringed upon their right to work,24 a right which is "fundamental"
under the privileges and immunities clause.25 Alaska responded that
A third view was that the privileges protected by the clause should rest upon a case-by-case
view "of the particular rights asserted and denied therein." Connor v. Elliot, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
591, 593 (1855).
21. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
22. The Paul Court stated that "[i]t was undoubtedly the object of the [privileges and immu-
nities] clause. . . to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with the citizens of
other States, sofar as the advantages resultingfrom citizenship in those States are concerned." Id.
at 180 (emphasis added). On the post-1868 acceptance of the Paul view of the scope of the clause,
see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1867-68 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
CuIE 462-63, 523.
23. In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978), Justice Blackmun announced
for a five-man majority that "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and
nonresident, equally." Id at 1860.
The purported basis for this conclusion is questionable. Justice Blackmun first cited several
equal protection clause cases-Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.
Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aft'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 98 S. Ct. at 1860. He then read the portion of the Paul
opinion quoted at note 22 supra to mean that the clause protected only "fundamental rights." 98
S. Ct. at 1862. Further impairing the Baldwin Court's interpretation of the clause is the fact that
even though some precedent exists for limiting the clause's protection to "fundamental rights," see
note 19 supra and accompanying text, considering it to apply only to those "basic and essential
activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union,"
marks a departure even from this authority. The fundamental rights of citizens are not necessar-
ily equivalent to the privileges which bear upon the vitality of the nation as a whole.
If the Baldwin Court's view of the scope of the privileges and immunities clause is valid, then
the case's narrow holding that access by non-residents to a state's recreational big game hunting is
not a privilege within the clause's purview seems proper.
24. 98 S. Ct. at 2485-86; Brief of Appellants at 16,23-24, 35 n.23, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct.
2482 (1978).
25. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), for example, it was recog-
nized that "those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental... [include
t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise .... . Id at 551-52.
The fundamental versus ordinary right dichotomy, of course, also plays a central role in
determining the degree of scrutiny with which a court will review legislation under the equal
protection clause. The right to work, however, is not a fundamental one for these equal protec-
tion clause purposes. Habron v. Epstein, 412 F. Supp. 256, 259-62 (D. Md.), aft'd, 429 U.S. 802
(1976). See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). Thus, the
right to work exemplifies the proposition stated in Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 166, 168 & n.16, that the
list of fundamental rights under the privileges and immunities clause exceeds its counterpart
under the equal protection clause.
The Hicklin plaintiffs also alleged a violation of their right to interstate travel. Id at 162.
This right is clearly a fundamental one, both as an historical matter under the privileges and
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the privileges and immunities clause has no application to the right to
work when the desired employment relates to state disposition of its
own property and, even assuming the clause is applicable, that the dis-
crimination effected by Alaska Hire did not violate the clause under the
appropriate standard of review.26
A. he McCready Exception.
Alaska's first argument has roots in the seminal case of Coifield v.
Coryel 27 in which a Pennsylvanian challenged a New Jersey law limit-
ing local commercial shellfishing to state fishermen. Justice Bushrod
Washington, riding circuit, held that despite any infringement of the
fundamental privilege to work in any state, New Jersey could limit the
right to fish from New Jersey waters to its own citizens. Justice Wash-
ington's argument rested on the theory that opening up the New Jersey
shellfishery to foreign exploitation would exhaust the supply of shell-
fish available to New Jersey citizens.2  Further, the legislature had the
power to "regulate the use" of that resource for the benefit of the peo-
ple of the state, since the fish were their "common property."29
McCready v. Virginia is a second landmark case dealing with
natural resources and the privileges and immunities clause. In
McCready, a nonresident challenged the state's denial of his right to
plant shellfish. The plaintiff contended that the right to plant in Vir-
ginia waters-in contrast to the asserted right to extract in
Co.Tfeld--did not involve any taking of state property.31  But Chief
Justice Waite chose not to rest the Court's decision on Co-fteld's deple-
immunities clause, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), and for contem-
porary purposes under the equal protection clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 634
(1969). However, the domicile preference in Alaska Hire does not impair this right. A domicile
requirement does not discourage interstate migration as does a durational residency test with the
latter's prospect of ineligibility for benefits, such as voting and public assistance, from the receiv-
ing state during a "waiting period." Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 166. For a non-Alaskan seeking work
in the state-connected oil and gas industry, the burden imposed by Alaska Hire's domicile require-
ment is only that he must forfeit his claim to benefits in his former state, presumably to receive
similar benefits from Alaska without delay. Id at 171. The immigrant wouldhave to pay appli-
cable Alaska taxes, but presumably his tax liability in his former state would decrease or cease
altogether. Id See also ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.090(l)(C)-(D) (1977), quoted at note 6 supra.
For additional discussion of whether durational and nondurational residency preferences violate
rights, other than the right to work, that are protected by the privileges and immunities and equal
protection clauses, see note 101 infra.
26. Brief of Appellees at 16-35, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978).
27. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
28. Id at 552.
29. Id Justice Washington's argument, however, was purely dictum. See CuRIEu 461.
30. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
31. Id. at 392-93.
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tion of resources rationale. Instead, he grounded his opinion on the
mere fact that the citizens of Virginia, and not the citizens of all free
governments, owned the Virginia tidewaters and their beds. Thus,
Virginians had "the power to dispose of [those areas] as they saw fit."'32
McCready was not to be the last word, however. Some seventy
years later, the Court in Toomer v. Witsel13 questioned McCready, al-
though it did not expressly overrule the case. Toomer struck down a
prohibitively high license fee for out-of-state commercial fishermen as
violative of the privileges and immunities clause. The Toomer Court's
language appears strongly critical of the proprietary interest justifica-
tion for state discrimination: "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is
now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of
the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource. 34
In light of the Toomer Court's strong intimation that "the
McCready exception, if such it be' 35 was no longer viable,36 Toomer
arguably reduced McCready from a complete exception to the privi-
leges and immunities clause to an affirmation that state authority in
dealing with natural resources constitutes only a "legitimate govern-
ment interest. ' 37  This authority would be subject to judicial review to
insure its rational exercise.38
32. Id. at 396.
33. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
34. Id. at 402.
35. Id
36. The passages disapproving McCready are admittedly dicta; the Toomer Court distin-
guished McCready without overruling it. See text accompanying note 33 supra. McCready in-
volved nonmigratory fish found in state waters. The statute in Toomer attempted through
discriminatory licensing fees to regulate the taking of migratory fish in the marginal seas. At least
prior to the 1953 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1970), states could not have
McCread-type ownership of such fish. See Commonwealth v. Westcott, 344 N.E.2d 411,412-13
(Mass. 1976), afd sub non. Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977).
The Westcot case involved a statute similar to that in Toomer, although the limitation on
nonresident fishing was absolute rather than just a financial disincentive. The dissent in the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court argued that the federal Submerged Lands Act gave states title
to the first three miles of their marginal seas and to the fish swimming therein, thus extending a
still viable McCready ownership principle to state regulation in that area. 344 N.E.2d at 414-18
(Reardon, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court avoided the Submerged Land Act
issue-and that of the continued status of the McCready exception-by finding that federal licens-
ing laws prevented states from discriminating against federally licensed boats, such as Westcott's,
in state waters. Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322, 323 (1977).
37. See Brief for the Respondent at 18-19, Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977);
TRIBE 409.
38. On the appropriate standard ofjudicial review, see text accompanying notes 75-81 infra.
An alternative interpretation is that Toomer merely recast McCready into a contemporary
semantic mold. That is, to support the continued nonreviewability of state discrimination relating
to fish and game, Toomer substituted the police power (the "power to preserve, regulate, and
1074
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Recent Supreme Court dicta lend credence to this position. In
Kleppe v. New Mexico,3 9 the state of New Mexico asserted that the fed-
eral Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act4° unconstitution-
ally inferfered with the power of the states to seize wild animals within
state borders.4 1 The Court upheld the federal statute as a valid exer-
cise of the article IV property clause42 and as paramount to any state
arguments under McCready.43 In responding to such arguments, the
Court chose to adopt the post- Toomer interpretation of McCready:
absent federal action, states still had "broad trustee andpolice powers
over wild animals within their jurisdiction.",
The recasting of McCready became even clearer in Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc. 45 In that case the Court invalidated on federal
preemption grounds' a Virginia law prohibiting vessels owned by non-
residents from fishing in Chesapeake Bay. In dictum responding to
Virginia's McCready-based claim that state ownership of the fish could
justify the discrimination, the Court stated that "it is pure fantasy to
talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. . .. Under modem analy-
sis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its police
power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution."'47 Finally,
exploit a natural resource") for the more antiquated "ownership theory." Alleyne, Constitutional
Restraints on the Preferential Hiring of41askan Residentsfor Oil Pipeline Construction, 2 U.C.L.A.-
ALAS. L. Rv. 1, 6-7 (1972).
39. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (Supp. V 1975).
41. The Act prohibited state seizures, such as the one in question, that took place on federal
lands. 426 U.S. at 533-34.
On the application of McCready to resources other than fish, see notes 55, 57 infra and text
accompanying notes 55-57 infra.
42. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... " U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3.
43. 426 U.S. at 545. The Court has also held the exercise of federal power under the treaty
clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2, and the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, to be
paramount to a McCready-type ownership argument. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (treaty protects birds despite state objections). Of course, the fact that constitutionally
valid federal action can prevail over the McCready doctrine is not determinative of the doctrine's
viability when, as in Hicklin, no federal conflicts exist. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
98 S. Ct. 1852, 1861 (1978).
On the relationship between McCready and the negative implications of the interstate com-
merce clause, see note 57 infra.
44. 426 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added).
45. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
46. See note 43 supra.
47. 431 U.S. at 284-85. Dissenting Justices Rehnquist and Powel, however, supported at
least a modified McCready ownership theory- "States have a substantial proprietary inter-
est--sometimes described as 'common ownership'.. . in the fish and game within their bounda-
ries. . . whether or not [this interest] rise[s] to the level of a traditional property right." 431 U.S.
at 287-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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in Hicklin, Justice Brennan spoke for a unanimous Court in confirming
that
[r]ather than placing a statute completely beyond the [privileges and
immunities clause], a State's ownership of the property with which
the statute is concerned is a factor-although often the crucial fac-
tor-to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimina-
tion against noncitizens violates the Clause.4 8
Aside from its resting on an anachronistic ownership theory, the
McCready exception to the privileges and immunities clause has a sec-
ond major flaw. The McCready statute did not restrict shellfish to
Virginians; nonresidents could purchase, but could not plant, Virginia
shellfish.49 Similarly, in Coifield nothing prevented Pennsylvanians
from buying, as opposed to extracting, fish in New Jersey.50 Thus, the
common reading of McCready-that states can limit their natural re-
sources to state uses5 1-mischaracterizes the case. In Co 6eld and
McCready, New Jersey and Virginia, respectively, in effect sought to
preserve employment in the extracting and planting of shellfish for their
citizens by closing their fisheries to nonresident fishermen.- 2  It thus
becomes evident that the "common property" basis of the McCready
exception 53 is illusory. Regardless of whether fish and game can con-
stitute the common property of the state, it is ludicrous to contend that
a state can "own" employment in a given industry. Hence, when the
restrictions in Coifleld and McCready are seen for what they
are-attempts to limit employment to state citizens-it becomes appar-
ent that they lack a justifying rationale.
Assuming arguendo that the McCready ownership rationale has
In dictum in a subsequent case, fellow Nixon appointees Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice
Burger also adopted a position more moderate than that of the Douglas majority-of which they
were a part. Their view was that MeCready continued to supply a state with a "special interest,"
presumably one greater than the police power, in preferring its own citizens with respect to wild-
life found in that state. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1862 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., for the Court); id at 1864-65 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also note 52 infra. Justices
Stevens and Stewart joined in Justice Blackmun's Baldwin opinion, again notwithstanding their
membership in the Douglas majority responsible for the extremely critical view of McCready
quoted infra.
48. 98 S. Ct. at 2490.
49. 94 U.S. at 392-93.
50. This fact impairs Justice Washington's theory that the Corfield statute prevented the de-
pletion of the supply of shellfish available to New Jersey citizens. See text accompanying note 28
supra.
51. See, ag., Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 172 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
52. Approaching this interpretation is the Supreme Court's citation of McCready as repre-
sentative of a "special-public-interest doctrine" that permits a state to "limit the right of nonci-
tizens to exploit a State's natural resources." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 n.11 (1973).
On other aspects of the special public interest doctrine, see text accompanying notes 146-60 infra.
53. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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some remaining vitality,54 one question raised by Alaska Hire is
whether McCready would extend to inanimate state resources such as
oil. The Hicklin Court concluded that it would, since the Alaska
Statehood Act5 6 gave the state full title to minerals below state-selected
land.57
The major problem with applying McCready, however, is that
Alaska Hire's restrictions concern employment rather than control over
a natural resource. 8 Since courts are unlikely to consider employment
54. As pointed out in note 47 supra and text accompanying notes 47-48 supra, the current
dicta of the Supreme Court are conflicting on this point.
55. The Court lacked the guidance of precedent on this issue. The courts that have not
rejected McCreadys ownership principle altogether have held that Toomer preserved
McCready's application to shellfish, which are nonmigratory. See, e.g., State v. Norton, 335 A.2d
607, 615 (Me. 1975). See also cases cited in Commonwealth v. Westcott, 344 N.E.2d 411, 412-13
(Mass. 1976), af'd sub nonm Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977).
The exception has on occasion been extended to animals. Compare Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1864-65 (1978) (Burger, C.L, concurring) (Montana has "special
interest" in preferring its own citizens in allocating access to elk found primarily within that state)
and Patstone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914) (Pennsylvania allowed to prevent aliens
from owning guns for the purpose of killing commonly owned wild game within the state) and
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896) (Connecticut's "common ownership" of game birds
allowed its legislature to prohibit their transportation out of state) with Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d
412, 414 (Wyo. 1973) (state not the owner of deer and thus not free to prohibit nonresidents from
hunting without a guide) and Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (treaty clause case;
state not the owner of migratory birds: "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed").
56. Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified at 48 U.S.C. following § 5 (1970)).
57. Id § 6(i). See 98 S. Ct. at 2489 & n.1 1. Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court had held
that the state's ownership of oil and gas is "less of a legal fiction than it is with respect to fish and
game." 565 P.2d at 168.
The objection to this view is that oil can be as much a migratory and thus nonpossessory
resource as free-swimming fish, which, after 7'oomer, are accepted as being outside of McCread/s
reach. See note 36 supra. That is, as the Supreme Court itself once held,
[p]etroleum gas and oil ... belong to the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as
they are on it or in it, or subject to his control, but when they escape and go into other
land, or come under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895). In fact, courts have often compared ownership of
natural gas and oil to that of migratory wild animals. See, e.g., Westmoreland & C~imbria Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889). Coal, which has a fixed situs,
provides a better example of a mineral resource subject to possession and ownership.
In any case, under the holding of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928),
Alaska presumably relinquishes any ownership interest in its oil and gas by putting these articles
into interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain denied Louisiana the power under the commerce
clause to require local processing of state-owned shrimp. The Supreme Court held that putting
the shrimp into interstate commerce "put an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed to
own or control the shrimp for the benefit of its people.' Id at 13. Cf. Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519, 530, 532 (1896) ("common ownership" of wild fish and game a valid basis for prohibiting
their transportation out-of-state).
58. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 172-73 (Boochever, C.L, dissenting in part). For mention of the
probable interstate commerce clause consequences had Alaska attempted to restrict its oil and gas
for state use, see id at 172 n.5; note 127 infra.
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the "common property" of the state,5 9 it is difficult to justify the
McCready exception as applied to barriers to nonresident employment.
One response is that Alaska's local hiring plan "deals with" 60 or, in
CoTfeld terms, "regulates the use of" 61 state-owned oil and gas. The
purported link between employment and the resource is the require-
ment in the Alaska Hire statute that the work-generating activity take
place on or be directly related to property acquired under state oil and
gas leases.62
Clearly, this link has some importance. Were Alaska to extend
local hiring to all private employment in the state, such a statute plainly
would exceed the scope of the resource-related McCready exception
and thus would be subject to review under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. Following the analysis presented below, the statute would
fall.63 On the other hand, neither the privileges and immunities clause
nor the equal protection clause prevents a state from preferring its own
residents for public employment;6a the McCready exception is not
needed to save such a preference.
Because of the link to state-owned resources, Alaska Hire falls in
between these two extremes. The Supreme Court in Hicklin found the
connection between Alaska-owned oil and the employment covered
under Alaska Hire "sufficiently attenuated" so as to prevent that con-
nection from supplying a basis for discrimination against nonresi-
dents.65 Indeed, Justice Brennan characterized the Act as "an attempt
to force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the eco-
nomic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop her oil and gas re-
sources to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's
59. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
60. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 169.
61. 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
62. ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.050(a) (1977), quoted at note 1 supra.
63. Such a statute would effect a much wider discrimination than the present Alaska Hire
Act, which in itself violates the privileges and immunities clause. See text accompanying notes
93-96 infra. Moreover, interstate commerce clause objections would quickly arise to such a wide-
sweeping employment preference. See text accompanying note 165 infra. See also truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (Arizona law excluding aliens from most private employment within the
state violates equal protection clause); Alleyne, supra note 38, at 8.
64. See State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 150 (Alas. 1973) (one year residency requirement for
state employment struck but bona fide residency test permissible). See also McCarthy v. Phila-
delphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), in which a unanimous Court upheld against the
challenge of a New Jersey resident a regulation requiring bona fide Philadelphia (and, thus, Penn-
sylvania) residence for city employment. See note 163 infra and accompanying text. But e
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, Ill N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971) (nondurational city residency
requirement for city employment violated state constitution's protection of "right to live where
one chooses.").
65. 98 S. Ct. at 2490.
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residents. '6 6 Certainly this interpretation makes it difficult to visualize
the state as "dealing with" or "restricting the use of" its common prop-
erty. In any event, even if under an extant McCready doctrine an "at-
tenuated" link to state-owned resources could insulate nonresident
employment discrimination from privileges and immunities clause ob-
jections, the interstate commerce clause might not permit such discrim-
ination.67
B. Application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to Alaska
Hire.
Assuming that the McCready doctrine does not provide Alaska
Hire with an exception to privileges and immunities clause review, the
question becomes whether the clause itself tolerates the discrimination
effected by Alaska's domicile hiring preference.6 8  Toomer states the
relevant test:
[The privileges and immunities clause] bar[s] discrimination against
citizens of other states where there is no substantial reason for the
discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other
States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many
situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.
Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such
reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a
close relation to them. The inquiry must also, of course, be con-
ducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have
considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing ap-
propriate cures.
69
At least one commentator has interpreted the Toomer test as in-
voking one of the two standards of review--"strict scrutiny" or "ra-
tional basis"-employed in equal protection clause cases, the
applicable standard depending upon the facts in each case.70 Indeed,
some cases involving nondurational residency requirements have been
reviewed exclusively under the equal protection clause.7'
66. Id. at 2491.
67. See text accompanying notes 107, 125-142 infra.
68. See, e.g., State v. Kemp, 73 S.D. 458, 462-63, 44 N.W.2d 214, 216-17 (1950), appeal
dismissed, 340 U.S. 923 (1951) (McCread ownership theory questioned as applied to wild game;
state power to prohibit issuance of nonresident hunting licenses subjected to review under the
privileges and immunities clause).
69. 334 U.S. at 396.
70. See CURRIE 475.
71. These cases, however, differ from Hicklin in two respects. In one group of cases the
plaintiffs originally challenged durational residency requirements. Although the plaintiffs had
not been state residents long enough to satisfy these waiting periods, they had at least moved into,
and were most likely domiciled in, the defendant state. Thus, the equal protection clause, which
prohibits a state from discriminating against persons "within its jurisdiction," constituted the ap-
propriate provision for purposes of judicial review. After invalidating the waiting periods, the
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Yet the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses
serve distinct purposes. The equal protection clause prohibits state
discrimination against persons "within its jurisdiction;"72 the privileges
and immunities clause proscribes discrimination against out-of-
staters.73 In addition, the equal protection clause has historically
served to curb official racial prejudice, while the privileges and immu-
nities clause has functioned to smooth economic relations among the
states.74
Thus, the better view is that judicial analysis under the two clauses
should not be equated automatically. 75 First, the Toomer test does not
inquire into the nature of any classifications created or rights restricted
by the contested statute as does the two-tiered equal protection (and
due process) system of review.76  The classic privileges and immunities
clause test stated in Toomer is unitary-regardless of the class or right
allegedly harmed, the applicable standard remains one of permitting
state discrimination only when it bears a "close relation" to a "substan-
tial reason" for discriminating.77  Second, the degree of judicial defer-
ence that must be accorded a statute challenged under the privileges
and immunities clause places the Toomer test in between the two
courts in these cases went on to speak approvingly of domicile requirements without changing
their reviewing standard to that of the privileges and immunities clause. See Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969) (welfare); State
v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 150 (Alas. 1973) (state employment). See also Comment, Duratlonal
Residency Requirements: The Alaskan Experience, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 50, 54 (1976).
Review of nondurational residency requirements took place under the equal protection clause
in at least two other cases because employment requirements were for city rather than state resi-
dence. The privileges and immunities clause applies only to discrimination against out-of-staters.
See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Donnelly v. City of
Manchester, I11 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). However, as indicated in note 64 supra,
McCarthy effectively involved discrimination against out-of-staters because a resident of New
Jersey contested a Philadelphia residence requirement.
The Hicklin plaintiffs raised both privileges and immunities and equal protection claims, but
the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the latter. 98 S. Ct. at 2492 n.19.
72. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also CuRRiE 475. See text accompanying notes 12-15
supra.
74. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (equal protec-
tion clause); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause).
75. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973); TIBE 409-12.
76. Under the equal protection clause, reviewing courts will apply "strict scrutiny" to a stat-
ute which allegedly discriminates against a "suspect" class or which impairs a "fundamental"
right. In the absence of such allegations, courts will examine the statute under the more deferen-
tial "rational basis" test. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
See also text accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
77. See quotation in text accompanying note 69 supra. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200
(1973), for example, the fact that the right in question-a woman's right to have an abortion-is
fundamental for equal protection clause purposes did not alter the privileges and immunities
clause standard applied. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1869 n.4 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
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standards of review used under the equal protection clause. Toomer's
requirement of a "substantial" or "valid" reason for state discrimina-
tion falls short of the "compelling" justification necessary under strict
equal protection clause scrutiny.78 On the other hand, Toomer's literal
insistence upon a "close relation"--and, interpretatively, its require-
ment of the least possible disparity79-between the purpose and effect
of the discrimination is more stringent than the corresponding demand
of the relaxed form of equal protection review that the statute bear only
an "arguably rational" relation to the asserted governmental interest.80
The Toomer standard does, however, resemble the "intermediate"
level of equal protection clause scrutiny that the Supreme Court has
occasionally applied in gender-discrimination cases.8"
In applying its own "close relation" test, the Toomer Court
stressed that the privileges and immunities clause would only tolerate
differential license fees tailored so as merely to compensate the state for
any added enforcement burden that nonresident fishermen might im-
pose. Thus, the Court invalidated the highly discriminatory license
fees at issue as going beyond what was necessary to meet this enforce-
ment function. 2
Subsequent privileges and immunities clause cases, although rela-
tively few in number, have followed this holding of Toomer. Together
they show that Toomer's requirement of a "close relation" between the
ends and means of state discrimination defeats a statute that sweeps too
78. See TRIBE 411 & n.17.
79. Id. 410.
80. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1976). Seemingly confirming
the fact that it was applying a relaxed reviewing standard, the Dukes Court overruled Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the only modem case in which the Supreme Court had invalidated an
economic classification. 427 U.S. at 306.
81. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); TRIBE 411 n.17 and sources cited therein. In
Craig the Supreme Court found violative of the equal protection clause an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to females under the age of 18 and males under age 21. The
standard applied was that an allegedly gender-discriminating statute must bear a "substantial
relation" to an "important" state objective. 429 U.S. at 197. Compared to the second half of this
requirement, the Toomer test seems no more stringent, especially if one borrows the "valid [mean-
ing, presumably, 'permissible'] reason" as opposed to the "substantial reason" language from
Toomer. On the other hand, to the extent that Toomer's "close relation" terminology means that
the state must use the least restrictive alternative to promote its objective, see text accompanying
note 79 supra, the Toomer standard seems more demanding than intermediate scrutiny's "sub-
stantial relation" requirement.
For criticism of the multi-tiered equal protection clause approach that Craig sanctions, see
429 U.S. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring); id at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 217,
220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Professor Tribe contends that the 1948 formulation of the Toomer test greatly influenced the
development of equal protection clause standards. TRIBE 410.
82. 334 U.S. at 399.
1081Vol. 1978:1069]
1082 DUKE LAW JOUATAL [Vol. 1978:1069
broadly.83 Some of these cases, for example, have focused on
Toomer's suggestion that only when noncitizens constitute "a peculiar
source of the evil at which the statute is aimed"'  might the desired
relation exist.85
Prior to Hicklin, the only recent Supreme Court application of the
Toomer test came in two paragraphs of Doe v. Bolton.86  In that case
the Court invalidated a Georgia law permitting abortions only when
the mother was a Georgia resident.87 Speaking for the majority, Jus-
tice Blackmun conceded that the residency requirement could have
"some relationship" to the availability of medical care for a Georgia
patient.8 Nevertheless, "some relationship" to the state interest was
not a sufficiently close fit; the Court invalidated the residency require-
ment because the evidence did not show that Georgia facilities were
filled to capacity in caring for residents. Moreover, to the extent that
the policy of preserving state-supported medical care for Georgians
formed the justification for the residency test, the statute's additional
coverage of private hospitals and privately retained physicians ren-
dered it unnecessarily and, hence, impermissibly restrictive.
89
The application of the Toomer test to Alaska Hire begins with the
observation that the Act purports to upgrade human resources and re-
duce unemployment.90 These state interests have been found to be not
only permissible, but also compelling justifications for classification.91
83. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-18 (1952); American Commuters Assoc. v.
Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d ir. 1969); Edwards v.
Leaver, 102 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D.R.I. 1952).
84. 334 U.S. at 398.
85. Compare Edwards v. Leaver, 102 F. Supp. 698, 702-03 (D.R.I. 1952) (no local evils
caused by nonresidents which might otherwise justify statute denying them commercial fishing
licenses) with State v. Kemp, 73 S.D. 458,462-63,44 N.W.2d 214, 216-17 (1950), appeal dismissed,
340 U.S. 923 (1951) (statute denying licenses to nonresident hunters of migratory waterfowl up-
held since such hunters constituted a peculiar source of excessive hunting; no further inquiry into
whether legislature could have prescribed a less discriminatory remedy).
The Hicklin Court suggested that even when a state demonstrates that nonresidents constitute
a peculiar source of the evil in question, the discrimination produced by the challenged statute
must still bear a "substantial relation" to that evil. See 98 S. Ct. at 2488. See text accompanying
notes 102-07 infra.
86. 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
87. Id at 184, 200. The Supreme Court found that the additional conditions that only a
licensed, accredited hospital could perform the abortion, and then only with both the advance
approval of a hospital "abortion committee" and a written concurrence by two other Georgia
physicians, infringed the right to privacy. Id at 192-200.
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id See TRIBE 410.
90. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
91. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 149-50 (Alas. 1973). Notwithstanding the explicit state-
ments of policy in the Alaska Hire statute, the Alaska trial court in Hicklin found the Act an
attempt to solve "problems that may be typified as social, racial, educational, and economic." 565
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Thus, they would clearly satisfy Toomer's requirement that a "valid"
or "substantial" reason for state discrimination exist.92
The more difficult question is whether the means employed by
Alaska Hire bear a "close relation" to its objectives. Since under local
hiring jobs go first to bona fide Alaskans, the statute would seem to
relate rationally to upgrading human resources and reducing unem-
ployment. However, it has already been shown that the "close rela-
tion" test demands not only an "arguably rational" relation but also,
quite probably, use of the least discriminatory plan available.93
Under this standard Alaska Hire runs afoul of the privileges and
immunities clause. The program proves to be an overly restrictive at-
tempt to lower unemployment in that it occasionally discriminates
against out-of-staters for the sake of preferring employed residents.94
As Justice Brennan noted, "[a] highly skilled and educated resident
who has never been unemployed is entitled to precisely the same pref-
erential treatment as the unskilled, habitually unemployed Arctic Es-
kimo enrolled in a job training program."" Alaska could more
directly ameliorate its unemployment problem by limiting its hiring
preference to unemployed Alaskans.9 6  Although the Supreme Court
questioned the permissibility even of this type of preference, 97 the mod-
ification would reduce the current discrimination against nonresidents
by elevating them to an equal status (albeit behind that of unemployed
Alaskans) with employed residents for jobs covered by the Act.
An additional approach to attacking unemployment directly-one
that Alaska in fact has adopted-would be to provide job training for
unskilled, unemployed Alaskans. 98 Manpower programs could in-
clude preparation for oil- and gas-related work. Presumably, the state
P.2d at 169. Considering such an attempt a valid state pursuit under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, the trial court upheld the Act. Id at 169. See note 9 sufpra. The Alaska Supreme
Court also ignored the plain wording of the Act and deemed the purpose of the legislation the
impermissible one of "economic protectionism." Nevertheless, it preserved the statute on the
basis of the McCready exception. 565 P.2d at 169. The United States Supreme Court accepted
the purpose of the Act as the reduction of unemployment, 98 S. Ct. at 2485, and did not question
the substantiality of that purpose.
92. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
94. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 164. Contra, People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 Ill. 2d
258, 273, 335 N.E.2d 469, 478-79 (1975) (preference for Illinois laborers on public works projects,
including those undertaken by private employers, bears a "close relation" to the goal of providing
employment for residents).
95. Hicklin, 98 S. CL at 2489.
96. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 164-65.
97. Hicklin, 98 S. Ct. at 2489.
98. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 164.
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could then make its hiring preference applicable to recent trainees.99
Reliance on an unemployed-resident hiring preference that ex-
tends to those Alaskans who, because of their social circumstances, re-
quire special training to become job-competitive, represents both a
narrowly tailored and an effective approach to the reduction of unem-
ployment.l°° Nondomiciliaries would still encounter some discrimina-
tion under the revision, but even Toomer does not preclude "disparity
of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid in-
dependent reasons for it [and where] the degree of discrimination bears
a close relation to them."10'
Aside from the statute's failure to meet the "close relation" test,
the Supreme Court found that Alaska Hire fell short of what it consid-
ered a second Toomer standard.'0 2 Nonresidents, the Court deter-
99. Id at 165.
100. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
101. 334 U.S. at 396.
It seems quite possible that the suggested revision would not have been necessary and that the
presently constituted Alaska Hire Act could have withstood constitutional scrutiny had it been
reviewed under the equal protection clause. (For the argument that the privileges and immunities
clause is more appropriate to test the constitutionality of domicile requirements, see note 71 supra
and text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.) The first question is whether a court should apply a
strict or a lenient standard of review. The application of strict judicial scrutiny requires the pres-
ence of either discrimination against a suspect class or impairment of a fundamental right. San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). While local hire classifies accord-
ing to residency, courts have not elevated residency-as opposed to alienage-to a suspect class.
See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 167 (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976)); TRIBE 411. Nor
has the right to work asserted by the Hicklin plaintiffs been judicially identified as a fundamental
right. Habron v. Epstein, 412 F. Supp. 256, 259-62 (D. Md.), aff"d, 429 U.S. 802 (1976). See
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
The Hicklin plaintiffs also sought protection of their right to interstate travel, which is well
established to be a fundamental right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 634 (1969).
The Supreme Court, however, has not chosen to apply strict scrutiny to nondurational domicile
requirements, thus implying that they do not impair the right to travel. See McCarthy v. Phila-
delphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976). See also Aranson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75, 77-
78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); TRIBE 410 n.10 and sources cited therein. In fact,
recent Supreme Court cases suggest that even a durational residency requirement may not in-
fringe the right to travel unless the "waiting period" in question deprives the traveler of a "neces-
sity of life." See, e.., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974); Comment,
supra note 71, at 57.
Since Alaska Hire's domicile preference does not create suspect classifications nor impair
fundamental rights, its equal protection clause review would take place under the more deferential
standard. That test is whether the challenged statute bears an arguably rational relation to a
legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1976). That
Alaska Hire promotes permissible government objectives in a "rational" manner has already been
noted. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
Professor Tribe has observed that, in general, nondurational residency requirements will vio-
late the privileges and immunities clause under the Toomer test but will satisfy the rational basis
standard of the equal protection clause. TRIBE 411-12.
102. As noted at note 91 supra, the Court ostensibly assumed that Alaska Hire satisfied an
initial Toomer test of promoting a substantial state interest.
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mined, did not constitute a "peculiar source of the
evil"-unemployment-at which the statute was aimed. 0 3 Rather, the
Court found the major cause of Alaska's high unemployment to be the
remoteness of many residents, particularly Eskimos and Indians, from
educational, employment, and job training opportunities."° Without
questioning this factual observation, the use of the "peculiar source of
the evil" test to probe further into the nexus between legislative ends
and means must nevertheless be noted. 0 5 Hicklin apparently marks a
departure from the more general, single-step inquiry into the tailoring
of means and ends of Doe and lower court cases.'0 6
II. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Independent of its link to resources which may be owned by the
state or of its status under the privileges and immunities clause, a domi-
cile employment preference may conflict with the negative implications
of the interstate commerce clause.' 07 "Negative implications" refers to
the fact that the commerce clause not only grants Congress plenary
power to control interstate commerce' 08 but also forbids states from
placing "undue" or "discriminatory" burdens on that commerce. 10 9
In determining what constitutes an undue burden on commerce,
the Supreme Court has looked either to the directness of a statute's
effects on interstate commerce or to whether those effects outweigh lo-
cal interests.10 The most recent Supreme Court standard, announced
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,"' stresses a balancing approach:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits .... If a legitimate purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
103. 98 S. Ct. at 2488.
104. Id at 2488-89. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 164; ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.020 (1977), quoted
at note 4 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra; authorities cited at notes 83, 85 supra. Justice
Brennan had proposed use of the two-step test in his dissent in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
98 S. Ct. 1852, 1870 (1978).
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. On the relationship between the McCready ownership doc-
trine and the commerce clause, see note 57 supra. As for the privileges and immunities clause, it
should be recognized that its protections overlap those of the commerce clause. SeeHicklin, 98 S.
Ct. at 2491; TRIBE 411-12 n.19.
108. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256-60 (1964).
109. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1950).
110. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
111. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on in-
terstate activities. 12
Under this formulation, the threshold inquiry is whether a chal-
lenged statute regulates or otherwise burdens interstate commerce.'13
Residential preferences can violate the interstate commerce clause by
restricting the interstate movement of natural resources or of labor.
The natural resource issue arose in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia."t4
In that case the Supreme Court held it an impermissible interference
with commerce for West Virginia to require its gas producers to accord
West Virginia consumers first right of purchase. The basis of the deci-
sion was that the local preference withdrew large quantities of the re-
source from interstate markets. 115
The Court in Edwards .v. California"16 confirmed that the move-
ment of persons is "commerce" under the interstate commerce
clause." 7  At least one case, Brown v. Anderson,"' subsequently ap-
plied this holding to restrictions on the interstate flow of labor. The
Brown court invalidated a domicile requirement for the use of certain
Alaskan salmon fisheries on the grounds that the statute restricted the
movement in commerce of nonresident fishermen.119
Once a burden on commerce is shown to exist, the question be-
comes whether the importance of local interests makes that burden
constitutionally tolerable.' 20 An attempt by a state to advance its own
economic interest is generally insufficient to override constitutional ob-
jections.' 21 Thus, in Pike, where the state's sole interest was the "tenu-
ous" one of enhancing the reputation of its cantaloupes to increase
their market demand, the Supreme Court found impermissible a re-
112. Id at 142.
113. See id at 140-42. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that contaminated or unfit
produce is not within the protection of the commerce clause. Id at 143-44. Yet it recently found
that solid and liquid waste does not constitute such a "quarantine" item. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (1978).
114. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
115. Id. at 595.
116. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
117. Id at 172. See authorities cited id. at 172 n.l. Edwards struck down a statute making
it a crime to assist in the immigration to California of indigent nonresidents.
118. 202 F. Supp. 96 (D. Alas. 1962).
119. One could interpret this holding of Brown as dictum, however, since the court also
deemed the statute violative of the privileges and immunities clause on the authority of Toomer.
202 F. Supp. at 102-03.
Perhaps because of its high unemployment and immigration rates and its vast supply of natu-
ral resources, Alaska has proven a prolific source of litigation over domicile and durational resi-
dency requirements. See Alleyne, supra note 38, at 7; Comment, supra note 71.
120. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
121. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (1978).
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quirement that Arizona-grown cantaloupes be packed in that state. 122
The adverse effects of a state policy on interstate commerce can
outweigh even a substantial local interest when the state could have
promoted that interest in less burdensome ways. A recent example is
Great Atlantic & PacOfc Tea Co. v. Cottrell,23 in which the state of
Mississippi sought to permit the entry of out-of-state milk only when
the sending state accepted Mississippi milk. The Supreme Court
found that to serve its health interest Mississippi had the "obvious" and
"less burdensome" alternative of applying her own standards of inspec-
tion to milk from nonreciprocating states.' 24
Turning to the possible interstate commerce effects of Alaska
Hire, 12 - it is apparent that, unlike the consumer preference in Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia,'26 the Act's employment preference does not
restrict the resource-oil and gas-in question. Indeed, the pipeline
jobs covered by the law exist to aid in the oil's out-of-state delivery. 127
The question whether the Alaska legislation, like that in Edwards
and Brown, interferes with the movement of persons and labor in com-
merce deserves closer consideration. On the one hand it might be con-
tended that Alaska Hire has only a small impact on the nation's labor
pool. Its provisions do not apply to all private employment in the state
or even to all private oil and gas employment. The Act reaches only
oil and gas work on state-leased property or jobs directly related
122. 397 U.S. at 143, 145. But f Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)
(Maryland, as purchaser, can prefer automobile hulks processed in-state since, if Congress is si-
lent, the commerce clause does not apply when a state enters a market). The state of Alaska
argued on the basis of Hughes that it could prefer its own workers when, through its lessees, it
entered an employment market. Brief of Appellees, supra note 26, at 49. One response is that
the interstate movement of labor deserves more protection than that of business operations such as
hulk processing. See text accompanying notes 139-42 infra. See also the view of dissenting Jus-
tice Brennan in Hughes that the Pike test should apply regardless of whether the state enters a
market as a purchaser. 426 U.S. at 827-29.
123. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
124. Id at 377.
125. Although the Hicklin plaintiffs did not raise an interstate commerce clause challenge, the
Supreme Court felt that an examination of interstate commerce cases such as Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), and Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. I
(1928), discussed at note 57 supra, would "inform analysis" under the privileges and immunities
clause. 98 S. Ct. at 2491-92. The Court did not apply the Pike test, see quote accompanying note
112 supra, as does this Note. See text accompanying notes 125-42 infra.
126. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
127. SeeHickiin, 98 S. Ct. at 2492 & n.17.
Given the "profound national importance" of domestically produced oil in the United States,
1d. at 2492 & n.18, any attempt to preserve Alaska's oil for Alaskans would undoubtedly place an
undue burden on interstate commerce. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 172 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting in
part).
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thereto. 128  The total coverage of local hire in 1976 amounted to six
percent of the labor force of the country's least populous state. 129 Fur-
ther, one-quarter of the covered employment actually went to nonresi-
dents, illustrating that the statute perfers, but does not require, Alaskan
citizenship.130
It might be further argued that the domicile status that the Act
prefers is available to anyone willing to establish it. However, estab-
lishing domicile is not burden-free. The migrant must forfeit the bene-
fits of citizenship in his former state. 131 Further, he must manifest his
intent to make Alaska his permanent residence '32-often an unrealistic
requirement given the short-term, "boom-like" nature of many of the
projects covered by Alaska Hire. 133
The domicile preference may thus restrict the flow of labor to
Alaska. To the extent the workers deterred by Alaska Hire represent
the most qualified labor for the available positions, the preference in-
terferes with the maximization of productivity in the nationally impor-
tant Alaskan oil industry. This result might, in turn, discourage
investment in the industry. In short, as a result of the obstacles it poses
to the free movement of labor, Alaska Hire "does affect and burden
interstate commerce."'
134
The issue thus devolves into whether local interests outweigh this
burden.35  Alaska's justification for local hire-securing employment
for its people-looms as a substantial one under the commerce
clause. 36  Yet under the Pike test 37 a countervailing factor exists in
Alaska's ability to promote this goal by the alternative means of pro-
viding manpower programs and limiting its hiring preference to unem-
ployed Alaskans. These alternatives appear to place less of a burden
on commerce in that out-of-state workers would not have to become
Alaskan domiciles to qualify for the same hiring priority as employed
128. ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.050(a) (1977), quoted at note I supra; Brief of Appellees at 6-7,
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1977).
129. See Hickin, 565 P.2d at 161 n.l. The percentage would undoubtedly have increased
with the upcoming construction of the Alaska natural gas pipeline.
130. Id at 166; Brief of Appellees, supra note 128, at 12-13. The 25% figure, however, may
reflect the fact that the state did not seriously enforce Alaska Hire until 1975. See Reply Brief of
Appellants at 10-11, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1977).
131. See note 25 supra.
132. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.090(l)(E) (1977), quoted at note 6 supra.
133. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 164.
134. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
135. Id.
136. Id at 145-46 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-04 (1948)).
137. See quotation in text accompanying note 112 supra.
1088 [Vol. 1978:1069
DOMICILE PREFERENCES
Alaskans.1 38
Whether the burdens on commerce outweigh the local interests in-
volved in Alaska Hire is, to be sure, not subject to precise determina-
tion. However, the commerce clause holding of Toomer proves
helpful by analogy. A provision of the statute in question 3 9 required
that owners of shrimping boats fishing off the South Carolina coast
pack their catch in that state. The Supreme Court held that despite
South Carolina's substantial interest in promoting local employment,
the likelihood that packing operations could be performed more effi-
ciently elsewhere placed an undue burden on commerce. 140  An ap-
pealing argument thus can be made' 4' that, despite Alaska's interest in
reducing unemployment, the free movement of labor, if jeopardized by
Alaska Hire, deserves just as much commerce clause protection as the
movement of business operations in Toomer or, for that matter, the
flow of inanimate resources in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.142
III. DIMENSIONS OF STATE LEASING POWER
The Supreme Court in 1940 suggested that, "[1like private individ-
uals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power
• . . to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and
conditions upon which it will make needed purchases."'143 This anal-
ogy of the government to a private contractor draws its early support
from the companion cases of Heim v. McCall'" and Crane v.
New York. 1 45 In both of these cases, aliens and nonresidents attacked
a New York law that required private companies and government
agencies with public works contracts to hire state citizens preferentially.
The Supreme Court, in sustaining the statute in Heim, relied on what
has become known as the "special public interest doctrine": 146 "[I]t
138. See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
139. 1936 S.C. Acts 1412 (struck down as unconstitutional, Toomer v. Witsell, 344 U.S. 385
(1948)).
140. 344 U.S. at 403-04.
141. Brief of Appellants, supra note 24, at 31 n.21.
142. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Cf Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (right of interstate travel occupies a more protected position than does interstate
movement of cattle or inanimate resources).
143. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). The case involved a challenge to
the Secretary of Labor's determination of the minimum wages would-be government contractors
were to provide their employees. The Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, but
Congress subsequently overturned the decision. See W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMINISTRA-
TVE LAW; CASES AND COMMENTS 178-79 (6th ed. 1974).
144. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
145. 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
146. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 n.1l (1973).
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belongs to the State, as guardian and trustee for its people, and having
control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which it will per-
mit public work to be done on its behalf .. ," In the state court
ruling in Crane, Judge Cardozo had made the similar statement that
"[t]he state, in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys,
may legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens ... ,14
These statements indicate that the basis of the special public inter-
est doctrine rests on the fact that the government uses money over
which it has a proprietary interest.' 49 The argument continues that the
government, like a private contracting party, should enjoy complete
freedom in spending its own funds.
In applying this line of reasoning to justify Alaska Hire, the state
of Alaska substituted state oil leases for the government construction
contracts in Helm and Crane.50 It then maintained that it could affix
such conditions as it pleased-including first-hired, last-fired prefer-
ences for Alaskans-to these leases.15 1 Since the oil companies were
free to reject the leases and seek oil elsewhere, Alaska Hire might be
seen as merely a valid, noncoercive exercise of the state's capacity to act
as a private lessor, free from constitutional restraints.1
5 2
147. 239 U.S. at 191 (quoting Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903) (contract to build
a municipal highway)).
148. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164, 108 N.E. 427,430, a#'dsub nora. Crane v. New York,
239 U.S. 195 (1915).
149. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 172 nA (Boochever, C.J., dissenting in part); People v. Crane,
214 N.Y. 154, 162, 108 N.E. 427, 429, a.f'd sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
150. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 26, at 47-48; Alleyne, supra note 38, at 9.
151. Brief of Appellees, supra note 26, at 46-49.
152. Brief of Appellees, supra note 128, at 54, 57. In addition to the specific objection made
infra, see text accompanying notes 153-60 infra, several general limitations govern the use of this
analogy. First, in contracting or leasing, a state government must promote a constitutionally
permissible objective. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 1595, 1603
(1960). Alaska, of course, seeks to reduce unemployment and spur oil production-both legiti-
mate state activities.
Second, when the government grants a privilege, such as a lease, which requires the grantee
to relinquish a constitutional right, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may apply to inval-
idate that condition. See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and ConslitutionalRights, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 321 (1935). The Hicklin plaintiffs did not raise an unconstitutional conditions argument.
For one thing, the grantees of the lease privilege in Hicklin were the employers, not the employee-
plaintiffs. But even assuming that the doctrine extended to third parties-a notion contradicted
by Professor Hale, id 327-28 (citing Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 254-55 (1898))-the objec-
tion remains that the employees are not in the position of accepting work upon the relinquishment
of a constitutional right. Rather, the asserted unconstitutionality is that the government has dis-
criminated against nonresidents by depriving them of work altogether. With one exception, noth-
ing the plaintiffs could "relinquish" would qualify them for employment under the oil leases.
That exception is their out-of-state domicile. Yet no constitutional right to non-Alaskan domicile
exists, nor does a bona fide residency requirement require the relinquishment of the plaintiffs'
related constitutional right to interstate migration. See note 101 supra. Compare the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to the situation in which the state conditions
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Yet, paralleling the fate of the McCready resource-ownership ex-
ception to the privileges and immunities clause, 153 the "special public
interest doctrine" of Heim and Crane has not withstood the test of
time. The Supreme Court all but "dealt a death blow"'15 4 to the doc-
trine by finding state proprietary interests insufficient to support the
denial to aliens of the right to engage in commercial fishing,'55 to re-
ceive welfare assistance,- 6 and to secure public employment.' 5 7  The
Court then summarily affirmed a district court invalidation of the suc-
cessor to the New York public works law involved in Helm and Crane
as it applied to employers wishing to hire aliens.' 58 In all these cases
the Court strictly scrutinized the challenged statutes because of alleged
discrimination against aliens. In Hicklin the Supreme Court specu-
lated that some vitality might remain in the Helm-Crane doctrine due
to the fact that it had not yet come under attack from nonresident citi-
zens' 59 However, the Court flatly rejected applying any of the doc-
trine's remaining vitality to protect the "pervasive discrimination"
mandated by Alaska Hire. 6
Without the immunity that a still viable Helm-Crane doctrine
might provide the government as lessor, the significance of the lease in
Alaska Hire is only that it represents one of the varied manifestations
public employment on the surrender of first amendment rights. See Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). For other examples, see Note, Democratic Due Proces.s:.Administrative
Procedure After Bishop v. Wood, 1977 DuKE L.J. 453, 471 n.102.
153. See text accompanying notes 33-48 supra.
154. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 584, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 89, 456 P.2d 645, 657
(1969).
155. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
156. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
157. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
158. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), agd sub
nom. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977). 4ccord, Purdy & Fitzpatrick
v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 584, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 89, 456 P.2d 645, 657 (1969).
159. 98S. Ct. at 2491 n.15. Cf. Salla v. County of Monroe, 90 Misc. 2d 427, 395 N.Y.S.2d 366
(Sup. Ct. 1977) (nonresident American citizens successfully challenged under strict scrutiny 12-
month durational residency requirement included in successor to New York public works law
involved in Helm and Crane).
160. 98 S. Ct. at 2491 & n.15. Even assuming the continued validity of Heim and Crane as
applied to nonresident American citizens, a possible basis for distinguishing these cases exists.
Heim and Crane involved the construction of subways and sewers, both of which are projects that
may be considered "public work." Helm, 239 U.S. at 191, quotedat text accompanying note 147
supra. Alaska Hire, however, does not involve what one would ordinarily consider "public
work." Except for the leasing connection, all states have left the construction and operation of
their oil distribution systems to the private sector. Further, the Helm-Crane doctrine rested
largely on the use of the government's own monies. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
In contrast, the Alaska pipeline, to which Alaska Hire applies, see note 1 supra, involves history's
greatest single-project outlay of funds by private enterprise.
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of state action. 61 A state should no more be allowed to impair consti-
tutional rights through a lease than through direct regulation. The
mere fact that it was through its leasing power that Alaska infringed the
privileges and immunities and interstate commerce clauses does not
save the Alaska Hire Act from its constitutional infirmities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The nondurational residence preference of Alaska Hire had two
constitutional failings. First, it violated the privileges and immunities
clause. That clause applies because the McCready exception, based
upon the anachronism of considering common ownership of resources
a basis for preferential treatment of state residents, has lost its validity.
Alaska Hire offended the clause by unnecessarily distinguishing be-
tween nonresidents and employed residents in an attempt to reduce lo-
cal unemployment. Second, the Act created an undue burden on
interstate commerce, thus running afoul of the commerce clause. Its
domicile requirement, especially when weighed against the express goal
of reducing unemployment, placed too significant an impediment on
the free flow of labor. The fact that the state's function in the local
hiring plan was that of lessor could not have insulated the program
from these constitutional defects.
Alaska Hire also threatened to open up a Pandora's box of state
restrictions on the employment of nonresidents.162 Although some
such restrictions may be unobjectionable, such as bona fide residence
requirements for state or municipal employment, 63 serious objections
arise when a domicile preference expands into the private sector. The
Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court, for example, raised the
spectre of an extension of local hiring to leases of state dairy, agricul-
tural, mining and lumber lands."6 Assuming the goal of such a sizea-
ble extension to be the reduction of local unemployment, the Toomer
privileges and immunities clause test would raise strong objections to
the unnecessary relegation of nonresidents to last in hiring priority.
161. See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
162. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173 (Boochever, Ci., dissenting in part).
163. See cases cited at note 64 supra. Unlike the domicile preference of Alaska Hire, most of
these requirements have undergone review only for minimum rationality under the equal protec-
tion clause. See note 71 and accompanying text sulpra. Further, the governments involved have
managed to offer objectives, such as employee loyalty and recovery of training costs, that make
bona fide residency a criterion more tailored to their achievement than is residency with respect to
reducing unemployment. For a compendium of cases see Alleyne, supra note 38, at 10 n.46.
164. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
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Moreover, the inhibition of movement of qualified out-of-state labor
into these key industries might significantly affect interstate commerce.
The most extreme use of local hiring by a state would consist of its
implementation in all private enterprise through direct regulation. Of
course, with the demise of the McCready and Heim-Crane doctrines,
the absence in such a program of any link to natural resources or to a
governmental lease actually has little bearing on its constitutionality.
Rather, the barriers to such pervasive regulation lie in more pro-
nounced versions of the same constitutional objections that would arise
when the hiring preference is confined to government-leased indus-
tries. 165
The most intimidating scenario is the possibility of all states enact-
ing employment preferences.' 66  One might presume that more nonres-
idents who travel to Alaska for work are disposed to become domiciled
in their workplace than are New Jersey and Connecticut commuters
who work in New York City.' 67 Thus, a "New York resident hire law"
unrelated to the special local interests governing public employment 168
might impose considerable burdens on the interstate flow of labor. 169
Moreover, as states created obstacles to immigration in efforts to reduce
unemployment among their own residents, the effect might be merely
to create unemployment problems in nearby states. The end result
might be a retaliatory use of local hiring preferences, producing a "Bal-
kanization of interstate commercial activity"'70 in which "each state
would become a separate and isolated enclave."''
Although Alaska Hire had not produced these drastic conse-
quences as of 1978, a compelling policy basis existed for the Supreme
165. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 173-74 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting in part). Prior to Hicklin at
least 18 states had resident hire laws applicable to private contractors on public construction or
procurement activities. Brief of Appellees, supra note 26, at 8 n.4. Certainly, the fact that the
funds involved are in a sense "owned" by the government would no more save these laws than did
the parallel Heim-Crane notion in Hicklin that as a lessor the state can act freely. See text ac-
companying notes 150-60 supra. Also, unlike the case of public employment, see note 163 supra,
it would seem difficult for a state to assert that the close nexus between domicile and employee
loyalty is relevant to public works employees. Finally, as a means of reducing unemployment,
public works laws that require the hiring of residents would be subject to the same means-ends
objections as Alaska Hire. But see People ex rel Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 Il. 2d 258,
273, 335 N.E.2d 469, 478-79 (1975) (preference for Illinois laborers on public works projects bears
a "close relation" to goal of providing employment for residents). Thus, Hicklin would appear to
have made these laws constitutionally suspect.
167. But see text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
168. See note 163 supra.
169. For a discussion of the equal protection clause fate of New York's preference for "citi-
zens" in public works hiring, see text accompanying notes 144-46, 153-58 supra.
170. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977).
171. Hicklin, 565 P.2d at 174 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
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Court's invalidation of the Act in order to avert such a result. But even
on its own constitutional merits, Alaska's local hiring scheme was
faulty. The United States Constitution does not permit a state to solve
its unemployment problems by imposing employment discrimination
on nonresidents.
Carl J Schuman
